

A National Preparedness Framework for the Human Consequences of Disclosure

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Executive Summary

By presidential directive, the United States (“US”) has entered the first stage of public disclosure concerning unidentified anomalous phenomena (“UAP”)¹, and future stages of disclosure, including those involving credible evidence of nonhuman intelligence (“NHI”), could have substantial implications for individuals, institutions, and society. While the US maintains a comprehensive National Preparedness System to identify risks, assess capabilities, and prepare for a wide range of physical hazards and emergencies, the system lacks a dedicated mechanism to prepare the public and the institutions upon which society depends for the potential psychological, behavioral, educational, cultural, and other human consequences of UAP disclosure. This lack of preparedness represents a national vulnerability, increasing the risk of unnecessary harm, confusion, misinformation, institutional strain, and erosion of public trust should future disclosures prove more consequential.

A fundamental principle of responsible governance is that governments prepare for low probability, high consequence events before they occur because the consequences of inadequate preparation often exceed the event itself. The US routinely prepares for pandemics, natural disasters, cyberattacks, and other national emergencies. Future stages of UAP disclosure, particularly those involving information that can alter the lives and perspectives of individuals and significantly impact society, warrant the same preparedness-based approach. Disclosure is not simply a scientific or intelligence issue, it is also an issue of preparing humanity to adapt to transformative change.

This policy brief recommends that the Administration direct the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), acting through the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (“ASPR”), to establish a multidisciplinary **National Disclosure Preparedness Task Force** (“Task Force”) that would collaborate with the interagency UAP Governance Board (overseen by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence – “ODNI”)², which is responsible for gathering and releasing UAP information to the public. Building upon existing federal preparedness capabilities, the Task Force would develop and oversee implementation of a **National Disclosure Preparedness Strategy** (“Preparedness Strategy”) designed to strengthen the nation’s psychological preparedness as outlined below while supporting public trust and societal resilience.

The National Disclosure Preparedness Strategy should:

- Develop scenario-based planning for successive forms and stages of disclosure.
- Assess societal and institutional preparedness.
- Define the core elements of psychological preparedness and assign responsibilities across federal, state, and local governments, healthcare systems, educational institutions, and participating organizations.
- Establish public health monitoring and scalable behavioral health surge capacity.
- Develop clinical and educational guidance for healthcare professionals, educators, and community leaders.
- Establish principles for public communication and community engagement.
- Recommend safeguards, research priorities, readiness metrics, implementation milestones, and congressional oversight.

Because this initiative builds upon existing federal preparedness systems, Congress should authorize and appropriate dedicated funding to HHS for implementation of the Task Force and Preparedness Strategy. The Administration should also work with Congress to ensure that the Task Force and any independent organization established to oversee the impacts of disclosure, are adequately funded, have psychologists and other behavioral science representatives in their multidisciplinary composition, and are positioned to coordinate effectively across the federal government.³

PART I

Preparing for the “Impossible”: Meaning, Culture, and Trust

The potential implications of UAP disclosure involving NHI are, by definition, civilizational. They have the potential to affect national security, international diplomacy, economics, anthropology, religion, education, and public health simultaneously.⁴ Although the probability, timing, and nature of such a disclosure remain uncertain, its potential consequences place it squarely within the category of low probability, high consequence events for which governments routinely prepare. Failing to prepare for these types of events can create vulnerabilities that exceed the event itself.

Governments do not wait for certainty before preparing for pandemics, cyberattacks, or financial crises. The same principle should apply here. Yet, while the US maintains robust preparedness systems for a wide range of national risks, it has no comparable framework for preparing for the potential human consequences of disclosure. This absence represents a national preparedness vulnerability, increasing the risk that future disclosures could produce avoidable harm, confusion, institutional strain, misinformation, and erosion of public trust. Earlier government sponsored studies recognized that contact with an extraterrestrial civilization could alter values, attitudes, and behavior, but stopped short of identifying how society should prepare for such an event.⁵

Importantly, a national preparedness framework does not require the government to endorse any conclusion about the origin, intent, or capabilities of UAP. Rather, it reflects prudent governance by acknowledging uncertainty, identifying potential risks, and recognizing that preparation can shape societal outcomes. It requires only the recognition that future disclosures could have significant psychological and societal consequences for individuals, institutions, and the nation as a whole.⁶

The need for preparedness arises not simply because new information may become available, but also because that information could require individuals and societies to reconsider long held assumptions about humanity’s place in the universe and the nature of reality itself. Such changes could influence not only scientific understanding, but also culture, religion, education, and public trust.⁷ Throughout history, scientific progress has required the revision of existing models in response to compelling new evidence. If future discoveries expand our understanding of UAP, they may likewise broaden both scientific inquiry and the questions society considers legitimate to ask and investigate.⁸

For that reason, a mature disclosure process requires both scientific rigor and intellectual humility. Science remains indispensable because it provides the methods for evaluating evidence and correcting error. At the same time, scientific rigor should not be mistaken for the assumption that our current understanding is complete. A responsible preparedness strategy should therefore maintain high evidentiary standards while recognizing that future discoveries may expand existing scientific frameworks.⁸

As scientific inquiry continues and society works to understand the broader meaning of such discoveries, people will inevitably ask questions that extend beyond what empirical evidence alone can answer. They will ask what disclosure means for personal identity, safety, history, religion, consciousness, our place in the universe and our shared future with nonhuman intelligences. Scientists, philosophers, religious leaders, educators, and other scholars will all contribute to that conversation, and reasonable people will reach different conclusions.

The role of government is not necessarily to answer those questions or to promote any particular philosophical, religious, or scientific interpretation. Rather, its responsibility is to sustain the conditions that allow society to adapt constructively by communicating honestly about what is known, acknowledging uncertainty where it exists, protecting public trust, supporting the functioning of essential institutions, and working with healthcare providers, educators, faith-based organizations, and community leaders to promote resilience and informed public understanding without propaganda, coercion, stigma, or inflammatory speculation.

PART II

National Disclosure Preparedness Task Force

To ensure a coordinated national approach to the potential human consequences of disclosure, the Administration should establish a ***National Disclosure Preparedness Task Force*** (“Task Force”) within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), led by the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (“ASPR”). Because the consequences of disclosure extend beyond any single discipline or agency, the Task Force would provide a permanent mechanism for coordinating preparedness planning across the federal government while engaging state and local governments, professional organizations, academic institutions, healthcare systems, and community partners. Building upon ASPR’s existing preparedness infrastructure would allow the federal government to address this emerging national challenge while ensuring clear leadership, accountability, sustained implementation, and efficient use of existing federal capabilities.

The proposed Task Force follows an established federal practice of creating specialized interagency preparedness mechanisms for unique, low probability, high consequence events that are not adequately addressed by existing preparedness frameworks. For example, NASA and FEMA established the Planetary Impact Emergency Response Working Group (PIERWG) to coordinate preparedness planning for potential asteroid impacts despite the absence of any known imminent threat.

UAP disclosure presents a fundamentally different preparedness challenge. Unlike physical hazards, disclosure may primarily affect psychological wellbeing, public trust, healthcare, education, religion, culture, scientific inquiry, government credibility, and the functioning of the institutions upon which society depends. Existing preparedness frameworks therefore provide useful models for interagency coordination but do not address the unique psychological, behavioral, and societal dimensions of disclosure that the Task Force would prepare for.

The Task Force would work in close coordination with the UAP Governance Board while maintaining distinct responsibilities. The UAP Governance Board is responsible for coordinating interagency disclosure activities and overseeing the review and public release of UAP information in accordance with applicable law, national security requirements, and presidential direction. The Task Force’s responsibility would not be to determine what information is disclosed, but to prepare the nation for the potential mental health, educational, and societal consequences of those disclosures. Coordination between these entities would ensure that preparedness planning, public communication, and civilian readiness remain synchronized with future stages of disclosure while preserving the distinct authorities and responsibilities of each organization.

The Task Force should be multidisciplinary in composition, including expertise in psychology, behavioral science, public health, education, communications, emergency management, religion, and other relevant disciplines. It should collaborate, as appropriate, with federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, healthcare systems, educational institutions, professional organizations, academic researchers, nonprofit organizations, and other public and private sector partners whose expertise and responsibilities are relevant to disclosure preparedness.

The Task Force’s mission should be to develop, coordinate, and periodically update a ***National Disclosure Preparedness Strategy*** (“Preparedness Strategy”) that strengthens the nation’s capacity to understand, communicate about, and adapt to significant future disclosures. Its work should not presume any conclusion regarding the origin, intent, or capabilities of UAP. Rather, it should prepare the nation for a range of plausible disclosure scenarios, from continued uncertainty to credible evidence of nonhuman intelligence.

Within 120 days of its establishment, the Task Force should publish an initial unclassified Preparedness Strategy for use by federal, state, and local governments, healthcare systems, educational institutions, emergency management organizations, and the public. The Strategy should identify federal government responsibilities, establish coordination mechanisms across agencies and levels of government, define preparedness priorities, and provide recommendations for implementation, evaluation, and periodic revision as new information becomes available. The Administration should identify existing funding mechanisms where possible and, where necessary, work with Congress to secure dedicated appropriations sufficient to support implementation of the Preparedness Strategy. Funding should support Task Force staffing, readiness assessments, scenario-based planning, clinical guidance, public health monitoring, communications planning, research, state and local preparedness partnerships, and periodic national preparedness exercises.

Because disclosure preparedness spans multiple sectors and may require sustained coordination over time, Congress should ensure that the National Disclosure Preparedness Task Force and any independent organization established to provide oversight of human related disclosure activities, including the expert Review Board envisioned by the bipartisan UAP Disclosure Act, are adequately funded, provided appropriate access to relevant UAP information, and include psychologists and other behavioral scientists as part of their multidisciplinary composition.

PART III

Elements of the National Disclosure Preparedness Strategy

The National Disclosure Preparedness Strategy should provide a coordinated framework for preparing the nation to respond constructively to a range of plausible disclosure scenarios. Although the specific form and timing of any future disclosure cannot be predicted, preparedness can strengthen societal resilience, support institutional continuity, and reduce avoidable harm across a wide range of potential outcomes. At a minimum, the strategy should include the following elements:

1. Disclosure Scenarios and Decision Triggers

Different forms and stages of disclosure are likely to represent different preparedness challenges, with varying implications for public understanding, institutional response, and societal adaptation. The strategy should therefore prepare for a range of plausible disclosure scenarios rather than a single anticipated outcome. Because of the uncertainty surrounding UAP, the strategy requires careful, clear, and robust definitions of key terms.

The strategy should address scenarios such as planned record releases, inconclusive or disputed evidence, abrupt or unauthorized disclosures, disclosures by foreign governments or private actors, credible confirmation of nonhuman intelligence, mass UAP or extraterrestrial sightings, and information suggesting benign, unknown, or threatening intent. For each scenario, the strategy should specify decision points, evidentiary thresholds, responsible agencies, information sharing and public notification authorities, and triggers for behavioral health, educational, communications, or emergency management resources. It should distinguish established facts, reasonable inferences, and unresolved questions.

Scenario planning should build upon established federal preparedness methodologies for evaluating plausible events, assessing potential consequences, identifying capability gaps, and establishing decision points for coordinated action.

2. Societal and Institutional Readiness

Preparedness depends not only on individual resilience but also on the readiness of the institutions people rely upon for information, guidance, support, and continuity during periods of uncertainty.

The strategy should assess the preparedness of governments and the institutions on which individuals and communities rely, including healthcare systems, schools and universities, emergency services, military and veteran's organizations, faith based and nonprofit groups, and other civic organizations. It should examine public understanding, institutional trust, mental health and crisis communications capacity, educational readiness, cultural differences, and the ability to absorb sudden demand for public health services, misinformation, and increased demand for other support. The strategy also should identify populations or institutions likely to bear disproportionate burdens or lack equitable access to information and care.

3. Elements of Psychological Preparedness and Allocation of Responsibilities

Psychological preparedness is the central objective of the strategy. It should define the capacities that enable individuals, communities, and institutions to understand, interpret, and adapt to transformative information while clearly assigning responsibilities for supporting those capacities across government and participating organizations.

The strategy should define psychological preparedness as the capacity to understand evolving information, tolerate uncertainty, integrate its implications, preserve functioning, and seek help when needed. Trustworthy institutions, sound communication, and accessible services support that capacity. Preparedness should build on existing resilience rather than presume widespread destabilization.

Five capacities are central to psychological preparedness:

- Information and media literacy to evaluate sources and distinguish evidence from inference.
- Emotional regulation and adaptive coping skills.
- Integration of new information through scientific, historical, philosophical, religious, spiritual, or cultural frameworks.
- Social connection and collective efficacy to strengthen resilience.
- Fair and equitable access to assistance that helps preserve essential functions.

The strategy should assign responsibilities for supporting these capacities across government and participating institutions. HHS should lead mental health planning, clinical guidance, monitoring, and surge capacity. The Department of Education should guide schools and universities. ODNI should coordinate releasable information, and the Department of State should lead international consultation. State and local governments should adapt federal guidance to local needs. Nongovernmental participation should remain voluntary and constitutionally neutral.

4. Public Health Monitoring and Surge Capacity

Individuals and communities may experience varying degrees of psychological distress or require additional support. Monitoring public health impacts and preparing scalable response capacity can reduce avoidable harm while preserving continuity of care.

HHS should establish a framework to monitor the public health effects of significant disclosures. Relevant indicators may include aggregate changes in crisis line use, psychiatric visits and admissions, demand for school and university counseling, reported sleep and anxiety problems, requests for pastoral care, and disruptions in health or social services. The framework should also protect individual privacy and prohibit registries based on beliefs, religious interpretations, anomalous experiences, or lawful speech and prohibit the use of support information for unrelated intelligence or law enforcement purposes.

The strategy should also identify mechanisms for scaling telehealth services, crisis consultation, group-based interventions, psychological first aid, psychoeducational programs, and other forms of temporary support. Surge planning should preserve access for existing patients and address professional licensing, reimbursement, interstate practice, rural access, language access, and the needs of children, veterans, older adults, and other potentially vulnerable populations.

5. Clinical and Educational Guidance

Healthcare professionals, educators, and other trusted community leaders will play an important role in helping people interpret and adapt to disclosure. Providing evidence-based guidance before significant disclosures occur will promote consistent, ethical, and effective support across healthcare and educational settings.

Federal health agencies should work with professional associations to develop educational materials and training for clinicians on disclosure related anxiety, worldview disruption, reports of anomalous experiences, spiritual or religious interpretation, reality testing, risk assessment, and clinical care. Throughout this work, clinical neutrality should govern. Providers should neither pathologize reflexively nor validate contested claims uncritically. They should focus on functioning, distress, safety, and the patient's needs, recognizing that clinicians and caregivers may be processing the same information.

The government should also consult behavioral health specialists, scientists, historians, educators, parents, and youth development experts to prepare adaptable, age-appropriate guidance for schools, colleges, and universities. Materials should explain key terms, the limits of current knowledge, standards of evidence, common responses to uncertainty, coping strategies, and sources of support.

6. Public Communications and Community Engagement

The way information is communicated may influence public response as much as the information itself. Effective communication should promote transparency, trust, and informed understanding while reducing unnecessary fear, confusion, stigma, and misinformation.

The strategy should establish an interagency communications protocol. Communications should explain what new information does and does not mean for immediate safety and daily life. They should avoid sensationalism, premature reassurance, and unwarranted certainty.

The Task Force should also establish a network of historians, scholars of religion, ethicists, chaplains, behavioral scientists, journalists, educators, and representatives of diverse communities which would be neutral and identify interpretive pressures, improve the cultural competence of public materials, and provide resources for community leaders.

7. Safeguards, Research, Metrics, and Oversight

Preparedness should be continuously evaluated and refined as new information emerges. Ongoing research, safeguards, and oversight will help ensure that the strategy remains evidence-based, protects individual rights, and evolves alongside future stages of disclosure.

NIH, the NSF, and other research organizations should support independent studies of public attitudes, institutional trust, psychological responses, effective interventions, and the long-term societal effects of disclosure. Readiness measures should include public understanding, institutional trust, clinician and educator preparedness, behavioral health capacity, communications performance, equitable access to support, and the effectiveness of privacy and civil liberties protections.

The preparedness strategy should also protect people, including military personnel, scientists, and aviators, who report UAP, abductions, or other anomalous experiences from ridicule, retaliation, and inappropriate psychiatric labeling. Agencies should provide secure reporting and support channels while clearly separating assistance from official judgments regarding an individual's experience.

Congress should require periodic evaluation of the preparedness strategy and regular reports on implementation to ensure that preparedness capabilities evolve alongside future disclosures and emerging scientific understanding.

PART IV

Conclusion

The US should prepare for disclosure without waiting for further resolution of the uncertainty surrounding UAP and without fear of major social disruption. Although most people would likely adapt over time, prudent preparation can strengthen resilience, preserve public trust, reduce unnecessary harm, fear and confusion, support institutional continuity, and minimize avoidable societal disruption. Responsible disclosure requires more than the release of information. It requires scientific rigor, effective communication, coordinated public health planning, educational and clinical preparedness, and sustained collaboration across government, academia, and civil society.

Whether future disclosures ultimately confirm extraordinary conclusions or resolve longstanding uncertainty, establishing a National Disclosure Preparedness Task Force and implementing a National Disclosure Preparedness Strategy would address a significant gap in the nation's preparedness infrastructure. Like other low probability, high consequence events, the value of preparedness lies not in predicting what will occur, but in strengthening the nation's capacity to respond effectively regardless of the outcome. The ultimate societal impact of future disclosures will depend less on the information itself than on how well the nation is prepared to understand, interpret, and adapt to it.

APPENDIX

Sources

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