

Concrete Next Steps for UAP Disclosure

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Executive Summary

As the Administration [continues to disclose](#) what it [calls](#) “new, never-before-seen” videos and other files related to unidentified anomalous phenomena (“UAP”), numerous options for disclosure remain unexplored. **This policy brief recommends specific, achievable steps for UAP disclosure** along three categories of information: (1) troves of compelling UAP documentation, incident reports, videos, and other data; (2) intelligence analyses of these phenomena; and (3) evidence of UAP crash-retrieval, reverse-engineering, and related programs.

The official release of several tranches of UAP records undeniably demonstrates that the government is sitting on far more UAP data than it had admitted. Although Americans [overwhelmingly believe](#) that UAP are real and want transparency, many within the scientific community, Congress, and the Intelligence Community (“IC”) remain skeptical. As discussed in [Part I](#), obtaining high-quality data showing UAP exceeding known human capabilities will help to convince skeptics to follow the facts. Granted, this approach is incremental. But a picture is worth a thousand words, and the whole world now knows that these pictures and other files exist.

[Part II](#) discusses a necessary but frequently overlooked corollary to releasing better data: disclosing intelligence analyses of that data to inform Congress and the American people what conclusions *their* government has reached about the capabilities, origins, and intentions of these phenomena. Raw data alone is not disclosure.

As discussed in [Part III](#), the release of evidence that the U.S. government has overseen clandestine UAP programs would be decisive. Such evidence would include acknowledgement and disclosure of UAP crash-retrieval operations and the recovery of non-human “biologics” and other materials. Despite [sworn testimony](#) from credible whistleblowers alleging the existence of these programs, neither the United States government nor any of its contractors has acknowledged their existence. To be clear: the government [should reveal](#) such programs.

Focusing efforts on disclosure of less than all three categories of data outlined above is rejected as inadequate. Fortunately, we need not sacrifice any effort on the other’s altar. An increasingly large cohort of lawmakers and executive branch officials are pursuing disclosure along each of these three fronts. But that process is slow, and more should be done.

This policy brief provides a few suggestions for each line of effort—where to look, what to release, and how to protect whistleblowers. Given the monumental nature of the UAP issue, no single paper can possibly cover everything. But what follows are some ripe areas for action.

PART I

Release Evidence Scientists Can Analyze.

Ongoing [disclosures](#) by the Administration represent historic progress. The government now says these releases [involve](#) dozens of agencies and millions of records. One can debate what these materials show, but one cannot seriously argue that the government had nothing to hide.

Unfortunately, much vital evidence remains redacted or entirely withheld. File dumps consisting of grainy videos of phenomena potentially defying conventional physics are insufficient. First, we need actionable evidence. That means raw sensor information—including mensuration, range, and kinematics—of UAP so that the newly formed [UAP Science Advisory Council](#) and broader scientific community can scrutinize the data and reach informed conclusions. In particular, high-resolution UAP imagery taken from satellites should be located and released.

The formation of the [UAP Science Advisory Council](#) is an important, if long overdue, step in making sense of these data. An earlier version of that council was struck on baseless national security concerns from the [draft bill](#) that established the [All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office](#) (“AARO”) in 2022. Second, the council should be adequately staffed and funded, its independence ensured, its membership broadened, and its access to UAP sensor data opened. Like the review panel contemplated by the [UAP Disclosure Act](#), the UAP Science Advisory Council—and any other advisory committees formed—should be resourced and empowered to advise the President on the release of UAP records.

The [statutory definition](#) of UAP was broadly defined by Congress to capture UAP in the air, space, and sea domains. Yet disclosures so far have largely covered only the air domain, neglecting the pervasiveness of these phenomena. Third, to remedy this omission, data from Space Fence and other platforms that have observed UAP in space, underwater, or entering or exiting the atmosphere should be released. “Swamp gas,” seagulls, and other silly excuses seeking to provide prosaic explanations for anomalous observations are largely inapplicable to the space and undersea domains.

Fourth, UAP data from America’s Solid State Phased Array Radar System—the world’s most powerful—should be scoured and released. Many of these radars are positioned to have corroborated UAP sightings like the [Tic-Tac incident](#) in November 2004, observed by a carrier strike group and decorated [naval aviators](#) operating off the California coast.

Fifth, files from the [UAP Task Force](#) (“**UAPTF**”), a predecessor organization to AARO, should be inventoried and released. It is hard to believe that AARO, empowered by [binding law](#) more than five years ago with sweeping access to UAP information across the government, has not found UAPTF’s files in its own backyard. One UAPTF file shows a clear image of a UAP that resembles a “button.” Another is a video of a UAP so close to the pilot who filmed it that he loudly exclaims, “Oh, shit!” **Where are these records, and why have they not been released?** These videos should not be classified, any more than the [Navy UAP videos](#) published by the *New York Times* should have been.

Sixth, in obtaining these and other types and sources of UAP data for release, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other IC elements should requisition all Intelligence Information Reports from relevant agencies that reference UAP or similar terms, along with all their attached photos, videos, and other ancillary or related records.

Sifting through reams of UAP data may be thankless work. But releasing a crystal-clear picture or video of UAP could change the trajectory of this conversation overnight. That conversation is long overdue.

PART II

Data Alone Is Not Disclosure: Release the Intelligence Assessments.

Despite releasing some data, the government has withheld its analysis. But has the IC not thoroughly examined the data, distinguishing UAP from balloons and foreign systems? Has it not analyzed observations of UAP the current director of the Central Intelligence Agency [found](#) to travel “at speeds that exceed the sound barrier without a sonic boom?” In an age when countries spend billions to produce the fastest jet fighter, it strains credulity that endeavoring to understand the advanced capabilities (and motivations) of UAP has not been undertaken at any time over the last 80 years.

Nor has the government explained why UAP files have been kept secret for so long—often well beyond the 25-year period after which information [is presumed](#) to be declassified by executive order. It has not explained a recent, disturbing [report](#) that the government propagated a disinformation campaign as far back as the 1950s to create false UAP documents as a “smokescreen for real secret-weapons programs.” **The government should clarify whether these supposedly false documents are now being released to the American public as truth, and, as [demanded earlier](#), verify to Congress and the American people that such a disinformation campaign has stopped—for good.**

Indeed, the government should do more than “let the people decide for themselves,” given the complexity of this topic and decades of official obfuscation. **Rather, the Administration should release its analyses of the capabilities, origins, and intentions of UAP.** The American people paid for these analyses. They are owed their government’s honest conclusions. Likewise, Congress and other policymakers responsible for providing for the common defense and developing a comprehensive strategy around UAP are entitled to such analyses. Do any of these phenomena represent a threat? Whatever the answer to that question, it must be answered. As others [have recommended](#), the Administration should commission a National Intelligence Estimate on UAP that can be released to the public.

PART III

Protect Whistleblowers and Strategically Grant Immunity.

Credible witnesses who analyzed UAP as part of a Pentagon task force have [testified](#) before Congress that the government has for decades conducted highly classified crash-retrieval and reverse-engineering programs. It is time to tear off the band-aid. As the Administration reportedly considers a national security directive or similar action to foster UAP disclosure, witness protections are essential. For its part, Congress should consider targeted UAP whistleblower protection legislation and empaneling a special committee to investigate these claims.

On its own, the Administration should announce that current and former governmental employees (and government contractors) are released from nondisclosure agreements to the extent they purport to restrict disclosures of UAP information to Congress. Absent an obviously compelling need for secrecy, disclosure to the public should also be permitted notwithstanding these agreements. Covered persons should include political appointees and senior officials [excluded](#) from the protections of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act—and any other person having such information. Because these alleged UAP programs encompass so many agencies and, therefore, congressional oversight committees, the Administration should foster broad-based disclosure to Congress.

A statement by the Administration reassuring potential whistleblowers and other witnesses that it would not seek prosecution or civil suit or engage in any form of employment retaliation for going to Congress is also critical. As [demonstrated](#) previously, the executive branch lacks authority to prosecute or sue whistleblowers for going to Congress. But such reassurance to witnesses—some who fear for the lives—would set the record straight and help to unleash potentially powerful testimony to arrive at the truth.

Still, as Congress deepens its inquiry into the government's UAP programs, it is important to protect legitimate national security interests that maintain America's strategic edge. But that interest, while compelling, should be narrowly construed to protect only legitimate concerns. We cannot continue to give a blank check to those evading Congress or the executive branch's democratically accountable leadership.

At the same time, a clear-eyed view recognizes that there may at one time have been understandable, albeit misguided, reasons for this undue secrecy, potentially resulting in the violation of laws and regulations ranging in seriousness. Without knowing the truth, the extent of such misconduct remains shrouded; yet those who may have committed such misdeeds could be unwilling to reveal the truth under the specter of legal jeopardy. To resolve this impasse, the Administration should consider directing the Department of Justice to strategically grant immunity to, or enter into non-prosecution and similar agreements with, witnesses who can reveal illegality related to any UAP programs.

CONCLUSION

Conclusion

The current effort by the Administration to release UAP evidence is unprecedented and represents a monumental undertaking. The suggestions in this policy brief are intended to assist that effort. The challenge is to hone the UAP data presently being released into meaningful assessments and to facilitate the prompt release of clear and convincing evidence, including evidence of crash-retrieval and reverse-engineering programs, and evidence of UAP in space. The opportunity now is for the President and Congress to collaborate in responding to the [vast majority](#) of the American people eager for the next chapter of disclosure.